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The EC countries' banana import policies are costly  mechanisms
for aiding preferential supplier countries. European economic
integration in  1992 provides an opportunity to reform those
policies and find more efficient mechanisms for providing aid.
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among  the  memlbers  of  the  Europcan  (-'onimu  by  preferential  supplicrs.  The  inefficiencics
nilv.  Thc  EC  Comimillissioni  intends  to replace  involved  in this  transfer  cost  thc  world  economy
national_  markets  \k ith a sineIle  markct  in  1992.  an estimated  $0.92  lor  cachl dollar  of  aid.
Al that  timc  a unifonn  policy  tov:ard  banana
imports  must  be  adopted.  Imposing  a  tariff  of  16.7'/,  oni (the  landed
cit  value  of)  all EC  hanana  imports  to  ftnance  a
Special  import  and  pricing  arrangemcnis  deficiency  payment  schicmc  aimed  at  maintain-
prcsently  confer  large  subsidies  to spec' itic  ing  aid  to preferciltial  suppliers  aftcr  1992  would
African,  Caribbean,  and  EC  territorial  dependen-  rnake  aid more  clficicit.  Every  dollar  of  aid
cies  - to the  disadvantage  of other  cxporting  would  cost  EC  consumers  an  estimated  $1.27,
(mainly  Latin  American)  countrics.  A  'conf-  nonfavored  countrics  $0.24,  and  the  world
mon"  banana  reginic  and  single  EC' niar-kct could  economi  $. .34.
substantially  alter  uorld  trade  in bananas  and  die
welfare  of  banana-cxporting  regions.  e  But  direct  payment  of  aid  would  be  the  most
efficieint  method  for delivering  aid.  A  tariff  of
Borrell  and  Yang  have  simulated  policy  16. l',.  on all imports  would  cover  the  current
options  open  to the  EC  in forming  a sinoec  level  of aid  traisler.  Every  dollar  of  aid  reccived
banana  market,  to  illustrate  the  impliications  of  by prefecrintial  s ipplying  countries  would  cost
chanige  for  trade  and  welfare.  'IThey founid  that  EC  conouniers  an  estimated  $1.01,  nonfavored
exportcrs  $0.03,  and  the  world  economy  $0.02.
- EC  adoptiorn  of  frec  trade  in  bananas  would
lcad  to a 9'CH  increa;se  in EC  imports,  a declinic  of  And  thc  aid-receiving  countries  would  get  a
46%,  in exports  by favored  coun.triCe  (cqual  tO anl  larger  net  bencfit  because  theyv \  ould  not  incur
annual  welfare  loss  of lUS209  millioni),  a  12'',  the  costs  of  producing  bananas  above  the  free
increase  in banana  exports  b)y nonflavored  trade  level  to qualify  for  aid,  as is presentl)y  the
cxporters  (eqtual  to an  annual  wclfarc  incrcase  of  case.  Thos-  sources  could  be used  in other
$60  million),  and  ati annual  increatsc  in EC  cnterprises,  and  thc  direct  aid  payments  could  be
welfare  of  $380  million  (in  1987  prics).  etFicicnily  targeted  (to niodenize  thc  banana
industries  or  perhaps  to diversify  thcse  ccono-
Current  policics  (compared  to free  trade)  mies)  - raltlir  Ihanii lock  resources  into  ineffi-
cost  EC  consumers  about  $1.85  and  non favored  cicnl  econiomic  seclors,  as  presently  happens.
l'he  PRE Working  Paper Scrics di.erminates  the fi5dinis  of 'xork  un(dcr  av in the laie  ani'  licy,  Rescarch,  and External
AffairsConiplex.  An objectiv  of tt  I.cseries is to  iet  the  t  findings out quj( kt  .*  en i prcseotdtions  are less than fultvpolished.
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1.  Introduction
The disparate banana import policies currently operating in member
states of the European Community (EC) are inconsistent  with the Community's
objective of  full economic integration in  1992.  Under  separate national
legislation, widely  varying  banana  prices  apply  across  different  member
states, varying  duties  and import  quotas  apply to the external (world)  market,
and internal  trade is virtually  excluded. The inconsistencies  are obvious and
politically they  are highly transparent.
Community imports  make up about a third of world trade and more than
40  percent  of  the  trade occurs  under preferential trade agreements. The
special arrangements confer sizable subsidies on some African and Caribbean
banana producers and disadvantage  other exporting countries --  mainly other
Latin  American  producers.  Adoption of  a  'common' banana  regime  in  the
Community in 1992 could potentially alter: the pattern of world trade, the
world price for bananas,  and the  welfare  of exporting  and consuming  countries.
The purpose of this study is to assess the main economic effects of existing
policies and of various  policy  alternatives.
A  detailed  review of  recent trends in  the banana market  and  of
existing national policies is provided.  A comparative-static  model of the EC
and world banana markets is used to illustrate  the broad trade,  welfare and
price implications of current and alternative policies.  And a  simulation
model  is developed to estimate the  impact of a range of policies for the
Conmnunity  after 1992.From the results  of the simulation  model the relative efficiency of
policy  options is assessed.  The results  do not provide  a basis on which to
predict the policy decision of the EC.  Nevertheless, the main policy and
trade implications, for the Community and for the various banana exporting
countries, can be inferred.  Therefore,  at very least some  assessment of the
contingent risks and opportunities  of EC market integration  is provided. But,
perhaps  more importantly,  the results  serve  to illustrate  and quantify some of
the less obvious costs that could arise from bad policy choices.  To  this
extent they may provide intormation  which  will be influential  in the formation
of the Community's  common banana  policy.-3-
2.  Background
2.1  The Structure  of World Banana  Trade
The production of bananas for export is clearly distinct from the
production of bananas for domestic consumption.  Ariong  the largest producers
--  Brazil, India, Indonesia, Ecuador, the Philippines and Thailand --  only
Ecuador and the Philippines are substantial  exporters.  Bananas are almost
exclusively exported by developing countries  to industrial  countries.  About
78% of world banana exports in the 1985-87 period  came from  Latin America and
the Caribbean, about 11% from the Philippines  and China,  and 3% from Africa.
Ecuador is the leading  exporter (accounting  for 18% of world exports in 1985-
87), followed by Costa Rica (12%), Colombia (12%), Honduras (192), and the
Philippines (11%) (see  Table 1).
World  banana exports amounted to 7.3 million tons in 1986, whi
generated US$1.8  billion export revenues for exporting countries.  For some
countries  revenues  from  banana  exports are  the  major  source  of  foreign
exchange.  For instance,  92% of export earnings of St. Lucia  were from banana
exports (Table  2).
The industrial  countries  accounted for 93% of world imports in 1985-
87.  The United States is the largest single market, accounting for 38%,
followed  by the EC, accounting  for 33% in the same period.  Japan has been the
most rapidly growing  market and ranked  third with 10% if world imports (Table
3).
World banana trade appears to follow  a pattern dictated by the trade
policies of  importers, perishability  of  the fruit, and high transportaticn
costs.  For several EC countr;is trade policy limits market access to a few
exporters.  The "Comonwealth.  - oducers  --  Jamaica,  Dominica,  St.  Lucia,- 4 -
Table 1:  World Banana  Exports by Country  and  Region, 1975-87
Share
1975  1980  1985  1986  1987  1985-87
---------------- ('000  tons)…---------  (X)
Industrial  Countries  338.1  433.7  432.0  438.7  440.5  6.0
Europe  338.1  433.7  432.0  438.7  440.5  6.0
Developing Countries  6,089.7  6,406.9  6,540.4  6,865.1  7,104.3  94.0
Latin America  4,300.1  4,878.8  4,947.2  5,121.6  5,433.8  71.0
Ecuador  1,362.4  1,318.2  1,207.9  1,365.9  1,381.2  18.1
Costa Rica  1,105.1  887.'  803.6  882.3  94.5  12.0
Colombia  390.0  691.6  775.3  857.0  912.5  11.7
Honduras  370.0  866.5  868.4  800.0  884.6  11.7
Caribbean  440.1  230.8  438.8  537.0  521.4  6.9
Africa  346.1  223.9  199.8  198.8  199.2  2.7
Asia  1,003.4  1,073.4  954.6  1,307.7  949.9  13.3
Philippines  822.7  922.7  789.3  855.7  775.0  11.0
World Total  6,427.8  6,840.6  6,972.4  7,303.8  7,544.8  100.0
Sources:  FAO, Banana  StaLisLics,  CCP: BA 89/7,  August 1989,
FAO,  World Banana Economy,  Statistical  Compendium,  Rome, 1983.-5-
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Sources:  UN Trade Tape.
IMF, International  Financial  Statistics,  Yearbook 1988.Table 3:  World Banana Imports  by Country  and Region, 1975-87
Share
1975  1Q80  1985  1986  1987  1985-87
------------------ ('000  tons)-----------------  (Z)
Industrial  CounLries  5,580.2  6,061.3  6,611.6  6,841.6  7,049.6  93.2
Western Europe  2,646.6  2,637.0  2,604.3  2,795.3  2,947 ,  37.9
EC  2,263,5  2,280.6  2,270.5  2,425.3  2,533.3  32.9
France  479.9  446.0  425.7  453.6  445.2  6.0
Germany, F.R.  547.1  530.3  584.4  635.3  668.7  8.6
Italy  304.1  300.7  307.2  339.2  362.8  4.6
U.K.  307.9  328.4  323.6  343.0  359.4  4.7
U.S.  1,793.8  2,147.1  2,772.0  2,815.7  2,780.5  38.0
Japan  884.6  726.1  680.0  764.6  774.8  10.1
Centrally Olanned
Economy  266.9  268.8  216.4  127.9  168.3  2.3
Developing  Countries  543.3  795.3  493.0  507.4  499.6  6.8
Latin America  176.9  439.6  187.4  217.0  195.8  2.7
Africa  62.1  32.0  13.4  10.8  10.4  0.2
Asia  304.3  323.7  292.2  280.6  293.4  3.9
World Total  6,390.4  6,856.6  7,104.6  7,350.0  7,549.2  100.0
Sources:  FAO, Banana Statistics,  CCP:  BA 89/7,  August 1989.
FAO,  World Banana  Economy,  Stat'stical  Compendium,  Rome, 1983.-7-
St. Vincent, Belize and Surinaine  --  export almo t exclusively  to the United
Kingdom; the French  Caribbean producers  --  Martinique  and Guadeloupe  --  export
almost all bananas to France; >;.e  Canary Islands  expor. exclusively to Spain;
some EC-associated countries such as C6te d'lvoire and  Cameroon export  to
France, and  Somalia exports  to  Italy (Table 4).  Perishabili;.y  and  high
transportation  costs limit  access to  distant  markets.  Therefore, the Japanese
market is mainly supplied by the Philippineq  and China, with Ecuador as a
residual supplier.  The Central  and South  American countries  export mainly to
the United SLates,  Canada, developing  countries,  Eastern Europe,  USSR and the
Western European countries which do not have special  trade arrangements  with
other countries.
2.2  The EC  Trade Policy
In the  absence of other  arrangements,  a common external  tariff  of 20%
is charged on banana imports.  However, many other arrangements also apply.
Banana imports .'-om  African, Caribbean  and Pacific (ACP)  countries are duty-
free  under  the Loihe  Convention between the EC and their former colonies.
Under a  special protocol of  the  treaty of  Rome, the Federal Republic of
Germany  may import  virtually  all its  bananas  without  duties.
France  has always  maintained  a managed  market such that two-thirds  of
its market  is  reserved for  imports from the  French Overseas Departments
(Martinique and Guadeloupe) and one-third for African franc zone countries
such as Cameroon, C6te d'lvoire and Madagascar.  French imports of bananas
from these protected producers  accounted for more than 94% in 1985-87 (Table
5).  Imports from other origins  are subject  to licensing  which is only
granted  when import  prices  exceed  a certain  level.-8-
Table 4:  Share  of Exports to the EC  of  Total Banana  Exports,  by Country,
1985-87  Average (percentages)
France  UK  IEaly  Germany,  P.R.  Total EC
Dominica  0  95.5  1.5  0  97.0
Grenada  0  98.5  0  0  98.5
St. Lucia  0  95.2  2.9  0  98.1
St.  Vincent  0  100.0  0  0  100.0
Jamaica  0  100.0  0  0  100.0
Suriname  0.-  S?.9  1.4  0  100.0
Belize  0  95.6  0  0  95.6
Guadeloupe  98.1  0.1  0.1  0  98.2
Martinique  99.6  0.2  0.1  0  99.9
Cameroon  91.4  0.7  4.4  0  97.2
C6te d'Ivoire  94.7  0.6  4.0  0  99.7
Somalia  0.3  0  67.2  0  67.5
Colombia  1.1  3.8  5.9  12.5  30.7
Costa Rica  0.4  0  6.0  14.5  25.6
Ecuador  0.3  0.3  3.7  10.3  19.3
Guatemala  1.2  0.3  10.3  1.3  13.5
Honduras  0.4  0.1  9.3  9.0  22.9
Panama  0.2  0.3  1.9  28.4  39.2
Sources:  UN Trade System.
FAO, Banana  Statistics,  CCP: BA 89/7,  August 1989.-9-
Table 5:  Exporters'  Shares in the EC Banana  Market, 1985-87  Average
(percentages)
France  UK  Italy  Germany,  F.R.  Total EC
Dominica  0  13.8  0.2  0  2.0
Grenada  0  2.4  0  0  0.3
St. Lucia  0  25.8  0.8  0  3.8
St. Vincent  0  11.1  0  0  1.6
Jamaica  0  6.7  0  0  1.0
Suriname  0.1  9.9  0.1  0  1.4
Belize  0  4.0  0  0  4.0
Cuadeloupe  25.2  0  0  0  4.6
Martinique  39.3  0.1  0.1  0  7.2
Cameroon  10.8  0.1  0.7  0  2.1
Cote  d'Ivoire  18.9  0.1  1.0  0  3.7
Somalia  0  0  10.8  0  1.6
Colombia  2.1  9.3  14.5  16.3  10.8
Costa Rica  0.8  0.1  15.0  19.3  9.3
Ecuador  0.8  1.0  14.0  20.8  10.6
Guatemala  0.9  0.3  9.6  0.7  1.8
Honduras  0.7  0.3  22.6  11.8  8.1
Panama  0.)  0.5  3.6  28.4  10.6
World  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Sources:  UN Trade Tape.
FAO, Banana  Statistics,  CCP:  BA 89/7,  August 1989.- 10  -
The  United  Kingdom  has  traditionally  granted  duty-free  access  to
Commonwealth  producers  such  as  Jamaica,  Dominica,  Grenada,  St.Lucia,  St.
Vincent,  Suriname  and  Belize.  Imports  from  dollar  area  countries  -/  are
subject  to  licenses  which  may  be  granted  if  supplies  from  Commonwealth
countries  fall  short  of  market  requirements.  Licenses  are  issued  by  the
Department  of  Irade  and  Industry  every  month,  following  recommendations  from
the  Banana  lrade  Advisory  Committee.  However,  a  licensed  minimum  level  of
30,000  tons  has  been  guaranteed  since  1989.  About  three-quarters  of  the  UK
banana  imports  were  from  the  traditional  suppliers  in  1985-87  (Table  5).
Italy  grants  free  access  to  imports  from  EC  members  and  associated
ACP  cointries,  but  imports  from  third  countries  are  allowed  only  within  the
limits  of  a  global  quota.  The  global  quota  fluctuated  between  205,000  and
265,000  tons  in  the  1974-77  period  and  remained  at  255,000  tons  until  1982.
Since  1983  it  has  been  at  270,000  tons.  Somalia  is  a  traditional  supplier  to
Italy  with  a  preferential  status.  However,  in  1985-87  it  supplied  only  11% of
Italian  market  requirements,  the  rest  were  supplied  by  other  ACP  countries
(2.9%)  and  Latin  American  countries  (Table  5).
Spain  and  Portugal  are  supplied  from  domestic  sources,  Spain  from  the
Canary  Islands  and  Portugal  from  Madeira.  Imports  from  other  sources  are
virtually  excluded.  Greece  currently  bans  imports  of  bananas  in  order  to
protect  domestic  production  estimated  at  about  3,000  tons  per  year.  However,
the  European  Court  of  Justice  has  ruled  that  Greece  should  relax  the  ban.
/  The  "dollar  area"  consists  of  Bolivia,  Canada,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Cuba,
Dominican  Republic,  Ecuador,  El Salvador,  Guatemala,  Haiti,  Honduras,
Liberia,  Mexico,  Nicaragua,  Panama,  the  Phillippines,  the  United  States
and  Venezuela.- 11 -
The discriminatory import restrictions in the protected markets --
France, UK, Italy,  Spain, Portugal  and Greece  --  have led to their  traditional
suppliers receiving higher prices than they otherwise would.  However, the
protection also hinders cost reduction and quality improvement in countries
enjoying preferential treatment.  As a  result, the preferential countries
cannot compete  with other exporting  countries  in  the free  markets.
The European Community will become a single internal market at the
end of 1992 when all internal  trade barriers  will be removed.  The protected
markets of France,  UK, Italy,  Spain, Portugal  and Greece, and the free market
of Federal  Republic  of Germany  will no longer  exist.  A new unified  regime for
banana trade, still under discussion, will replace the current regimes of
individual member states.  The European Commissiorn  has  indicated that the
interests of ACP banana exporters  are likely to be protected under the new
trade regime.  Nonetheless,  existing  arrangements  will need to be changed  and
several different  means could  be used to preserve  current interests.- 12  -
3.  Representation  of the Current  Policies
The main features  of the  various  policy regimes  currently  applying in
the member states  of the European Community  are illustrated  in figure 1.  The
representation is an adaption from Noichl (1985).  In all cases supply and
demand curves represent, respectively,  the supply of exports and the demand
for imports.  Country A represents  countries such as Italy,  Spain, Portugal,
France and Great Britain  which provide preferential  market access to favored
suppliers  at a fixed  domestic  market price  and which use  quotas to limit  other
ir.ports.  Country  B  represents  countries  such  as  Denmark,  Ireland,
Netherlands, Belgium and  Luxembourg which  impose a  20  percent  tariff  on
imports and otherwise  allow for the  unrestricted  access  of bananas.  Country C
represents Germany  which  for  all  intents and  purposes  imposes no  trade
barriers.  The  rest of the world sector mainly represents other developed
countries'  import demand and the export supply  of non-favored Latin American
countries,  the  Philippines and China.  Trade between  these  countries is
assumed to be totally  unrestricted.
Favored suppliers are not restricted  in their access to A's market
and they export quantity  Ql at price DP.  The domestic  market shortfall (Q3-
Ql)  is made up  by  imports from other ACP countries (Q2-Ql) and the world
market (Q3-Q2).  Import quotas  are allocated  to control the volume of imports
to maintain  the fixed internal price.  The various EC governments involved
pocket the difterence between the world price and the domestic market price
unless  the  supplier is another ACP country.  In that case ACP  countries
receive  the world price plus the 20 percent tariff and the EC government
pockets the difference between the tariff price  and the domestic price only.
While the supplies  from favored  suppliers  and ACP countries  to  countries of- 13-
type A are upward sloping the supply of quota bananas is virtually  perfectly
elastic at the  world price.
ACP suppliers  to the countries  of type B face the same situation as
'other'  ACP suppliers  to type A countries.  On non-ACP imports (Q5-Q4)  type B
governments collect a tariff of 20 percent.  In the type C country, import
supply is virtually perfectly elastic at the world price and at the world
price consumers  demand Q6.  The rest of the world supplies (Q8-Q7)  exports to
meet import  demand in countries  of type  A, B, and C.
The  economic effects  of  current policies can  be  demonstrated by
comparing the situation represented in figure 1 to that which would exist
under free trade.  In figure  2 type A and type  B countries  are assumed to have
the same free trade policy as the type C country.  Facing a lower price for
bananas, consumers increase  demand in countries of types A and B (from Q3 to
Q3' and from Q5 to Q5').  Their increased  import  demand causes some increase
in world price.  The lower prices received by previously favored exporting
countries,  and possibly  the 'other'  ACP countries,  cause  a reduction in supply
from those countries (they do not produce  along portions 0-Ql of SF or Ql-Q2
and 0'-Q4 of SACP --  now shown  at far right  of the rest  of world supply).  The
opposite effects occur in other countries.  Induced by the increase  in world
price, consumption in country C and the rest of  the world declines while
supply from the rest of the world increases.  A new equilibrium  price settles
at WP'.
Consumer surplus increases  by the area a +  b +  c in type  A countries
and by area e  +  f  +  h in type B countries (Figure 2).  Government tariff
revenues decline by areas b + d and f + g.  In country  C and the rest of the
world consumer surplus  declines  by,  areas i  +  j  and k +  1, respectively./  21  314/1
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Producer rents  in  favored supplying countries and in other  ACP countries
decline  by  areas greater  than p  and  q  (triangular areas defined on  the
downside where the respective  supply curves of these countries intersect the
new wprld price WP'). 1  Producer  rents in the rest of the world increase  by
the area k +  I  +  m +  n. Economic  surplus  worldwide  changes  by the net area c +
h +  n - j - 1  - p - q.  Because  n is greater  than p +  q and c +  h is greater
than j  +  1 the change in economic surplus is positive, representing more
efficient resource  allocation.
The  overall effects of current policies of  the EC  countries can
therefore be seen as:  a decrease in world price; subsidization  of favored
country suppliers and of consumers in country  C and the rest of the world by
producers in non-favored  countries  and by consumers  in EC countries  of type  A
and B; the raising  of revenue  for governments  in EC countries  of type  A and B;
and resource  misallocation  across several  countries.
4.  Measuring the Effects  of Current  and Alternative  Policies
To  estimate  the  economic  effects  of  current  policies  and  of
alternative policies which the European Community may consider adopting in
1992, a (static, partial equilibrium)  simulation  model was built.  The model
embodies the features  of the theoretical  model shown in figure 1 but includes
a  greater number of regions.  France, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of
Germany,  Italy,  Spain  and  Portugal  together,  the  rest  of  the  European
Community, and  the  rest of  the world are represented as separate import-
demanding regions.  Cuadeloupe and Martinique together, the Windward Islands
For the sake  of analysis  SF and SACP  of Figure  1 form  part  of the supply
curve S of Figure  2, which is drawn  as discontinous.  The loss  of welfare
to producers  in favored  countries  is  therefore  the loss  of producers
surplus,  which  will be larger  than the  area indicated  by p and q.- 17  -
(Dominica,  Grenada, St. Lucia and St.  Vincent) and Jamaica together, Somalia,
Canary Islands and  Madeira together, Cameroon and C6te d'Ivoire together,
other ACP countries  as a group, and the rest of the  world are represented as
separate  export supply  regions.
4.1  Specification  of the Model:
-Export Supply
Xi =  fi(DPm-TMm)  i = favored  nation suppliers
Xj =  fj(WP+T-TMn)  j  =  ACP suppliers
Xk =  fk(WP-TM )  k =  non-favored  suppliers
-Import Demand
Im =  fm(DPm)  m = quota-protected  markets  of EC
In =  fn(WP+T)  n =  tariff-protected  markets  of EC
Ip =  fp(WP)  p =  free  markets  of the  EC and rest  of world
-Market Clearing
LX =  £I
ijk  mnp
where X = exports,  I = imports,  DP = fixed  domestic  consumer  prices,
WP =  world consumer price,  T = tariff,  TM = transportation  costs
and traders'  mark-ups
4.2  Parameters  of the  Model:
The price elasticity of supply was initially  set at 1.0 for the favored
suppliers  and  ACP  suppliers.  For  non-favored  suppliers  the  price
elasticity  of supply  was set  at 3.  Qualitative  analysis  by the World Bank
indicates that  exporting  countries in general  have vast areas of marginal
land suitable  for banana  production. They can easily  adjust  production to
meet greater international  demand without  major increases  in average farm- 18 -
costs.  Setting the price elasticity of supply from rest of theu  o01HA
exporters  at 3 capLures  this  characteristic  of the  market.  In the case ol
favored suppliers and ACI)  exporters the availability of'  land is niot  so
great and competitive alternative uses for  the land aL currenlt  export
prices  are limited.  'I'he  price elasticity of supply is therefore likely
to be less than for the non-favored  suppliers.  One estimate  of the price
elasticity of  supply  tor Jamaica is 0.49  (Pollard and Grahtarii,  198.)
Initially,  supply  elasticities  were  seL  at one-third  Lhose  of flOn-ti\Voied
suppliers  t.o  account  for  the dif'ference in supply  between  the  different.
types of  export suppliers.
Estimates  of price elasticities  of demand (World Bank, 1985)  were used to
parameterize the import  demand equations.  Elasticity  estimates  range from
-0.4 for the rest of world sector  to -- 1.0  for  Italy.
4.3  Results of the  Model Simulations:
In Table 6 a  baseline  and free trade scenario  are presented.  The
baseline scenario is set up to broadly replicate the pattern of tLrade  and
price differenLials  applying in 1u87.  Data used for  trade  and prices  are from
FAO (1989).  'I'he  protected  consumer  prices  vary  among countries  but in  general
they are  in the order of 10 to 50 percent above the free markeL price in
Germany, while retail prices in Germany are considerably higher than in tile
large free US market --  largely due to differences in transport costb.  (sce
Table 6).  However, the export prices  for Lhe favored  exporting  countries  are
also much higher than those for the non-favored  exporting  countries.  As  5'ith
the representation in Figurte  2, a comparison between the baseline and free
trade  scenarios serves to  illustrate the economic effects of  lthe  present
policies.  The comparison reveals  a 9.1% increase  in imports  antd  therefore  in- 19  -
consumption il the European Community from a move to free trade.  Although
imports and consumption  decline marginally in Germany and in the rest of the
world, total imports increase by 2.4%.  Exports from favored suppliers are
estimated to decline by 46.4% while non-favored suppliers. when allowed to
compete in the EC, increase exports by 11.8%.  Overall, the world price as
represented by the US  (FOR) price is estimated to increase by  2.3%.  The
increased consumption and  lower domestic prices bring substantial economic
gains to consumers in EC countries, except for  Germany.  (It is assumed that
retail prices in all EC countries  would equate with those in  Germany, and not
fall further since Germany already has a free market).  Tariff revenues fall
in EC countries.  In total, the European  Cormnunity  is estimated to increase
its  economic  welfare  by  $386 million annually  (all dollars are  in  1987
values).
Because of the higher world prices,  consumer welfare in Germany and
in  qe  rest  of  the  world  is  reduced  by  $6  million  and  $46  million,
respectively.  Gains  to non-favored exporting countries, estimated at  $61
million annually,  arise from higher world prices and greater access to the EC
market.  The main  losers of a  shift to free trade would be producers in
favored  exporting  countries whose  welfare  declines by  an  estimated  $209
million annually.
It can be inferred from the above results that the annual value of
current EC policies  to favored  nations is $209 million.  Considering  that the
annual value ol total exports from favored countries in the baseline case
amounts to around $576 million only, the protection  afforded by the policies
is of obvious importance to these countries --  effectively a major form of
aid.  However, every dollar of aid thus transferred to favored exporting
countries costs  the EC  $1.85 and  imposes a  cost of  $0.29 on non-favored- 20 -
exporting  countries.  In effect,  the policies are  causing  one group  of
developing countries to subsidize  another.  Ironically,  it is the rest of the
world sector (which is composed principally of industrial countries such as
the United StaLes  and Japan) which gains as a result of the EC policies.  The
industrial countries profit to the tu,ne  of $0.22 for every dollar of aid
transferred to the favored  exporting countries.  Overall, an estimated $0.92
is lost from the world economy through inefficiencies  created by transferring
each dollar to tavored  exporting  countries. By any measure the policy  appears
to  be  highly  inefficient as an  instrument for delivering aid  to  favored
exporting countries.
To test the sensitivity  of the results to changes in some  of the key
assumptions two tests  were conducted.  In the first test the price  elasticity
of supply for non-favored  exporting  nations  was set equal to the elasticity in
other countries.  The result are given in Table 6.  In this case the effects
of  free  trade on  world  price are more  than double those reported in the
previous case.  The effects on the EC and the favored  exporters are similar
but the effecLs on non-favored exporters  and rest of the world consumers  are
over  twice those shown in the previous case.  Although the elasticity of
supply is not  known with a  high degree of accuracy, the results serve to
demonstrate thaL the costs  ot EC policies  have the potential  to be very large.
In  the second senisitivity  test the price elasticity of  supply of
favored exporting  countries was  lowered in  line with  the  only  available
estimated elasticity ot'  0.49  for Jamaica.  Although this  results in  the
estimated  benetits  ot  existing  policies  to  favored exporters  rising  as
compared to Lhe first case, the effects  are much less dramatic than those  for
non-favored  exporters.- 21  -
Retail prices in the European Cofmmunity  were assumed to remain well
above US retail prices  under free trade.  If  not, the  economic  gains of a move
to  free  trade may  be  understated.  In the absence of  import quotas and
licensing arrangements, a larger, more competitive  European market may well
confer  additional benefits on  consumers in  the  form of  lower markoting,
retailing  and possibly  transport  costs.  Were this to occur, EC banana  demand
could increase  more than indicated  by the results in  Table 6.  Ezonomic  gains
to the EC and non-favored  exporters  would then  exceed those  shown in  Table 6.
Alternative Policies  in 1992
It  is unlikely that the EC will adopt a policy of free trade in
bananas in 1992.  Four possible alternative policy scenarios were simulated
with the model.  In the first it was assumed that the 20% tariff, currently
the policy in the Netherlands,  Denmark,  Belgium,  Luxembourg  and Ireland,  would
be extended throughout  the Community.  Favored  exports to the EC were assumed
to retain some preference in the form of duty-free access.  The simulation
results are shown in Table 7.  Compared to the free trade scenario, world
welfare gains are less because Community consumers do not receive the full
benefits of world prices  and rationalization  of production  among suppliers is
not maximized.  Consumers in F.R. Germany fare particularly  badly, (-$85m),
since  banana prices rise considerably  --  although  government  revenue increases
by  a  similar  amount  ($81m).  Strictly speaking, this  revenue  would  be
collected by the EC not by a member state.
The second  scenario  assumes that all preferences  would be eliminated
and  a  20%  tariff  imposed on  EC  banana  imports from all  sources.  The
simulation results are shown in Table 8.  Under this scenario,  world welfare
is somewhat lower than in the case of free trade  but higher than in the case- 22  -
where a 20% tariff is imposed only on imports from dollar areas. The non-
discriminatory tariff allows  further rationalization of production between
exporters.  Compared with  iree trade, EC consumers' welfare is less while
government revenue  increases.  Compared  to the  case where a discriminatory  20%
tariff is imposed, EC consumers'  welfare is reduced slightly  while welfare  of
preferential exporters declines substantially.  Such declines in the welfare
of preferential exporters are likely to make the policy unacceptable to the
EC.
A  policy  alternative the  Community may  consider as  a  means  of
continuing protection for tavored  exporters is to use a tariff on imports to
finance a deficiency payment scheme for preferential  exporters.  Deficiency
payments could be set to cover the difference  between the world export price
and the  current protected  export price  paid to favored  exporters,  thus leaving
favored  exporters'  welfare  unchanged.  In  effect, the tariff  would be set at a
rate  sufficient to offset  the deficiency payments.  The EC  has  shown a
preference for self-financing  schemes.  Simulation results of such a scheme
are given in Table  9.
A tariff of 16.7%  on all banana imports (i.e.,  on the landed c.i.f.
value) would be required to finance the continued subsidization  of favored
exporting countries.  The effect on the Community  as a whole would be for a
sizable increase in  welfare compared  to the current situation  --  $120 million
annually.  Within the Community, F.R. Germany would be a major loser, while
consumers in  most other countries  would obtain  sizable  benefits  --  although to
a large extent at the cost of government  revenues.  The effect on the rest of
the world would be relatively  neutral; although  increased  exports from dollar
areas and slightly higher world prices for bananas confer some benefits on
dollar area exporters ($11.3m).Table  6:  Etfects  of  Qirrent  SC Camtry  Bwwa  Iblicies
Free  Trade
saeli  EFWI  Welfare  ChoW  a1w  Welfare  Chare  EFN".5  Welfare  hauae
11W3  (milLion  US$)  EllO  (sdllon  US$)  Elll'  (llUon  15$)
Prices  (US/Tmon)
IN  tit  393.0  402.1  415.6  408.2
US Retail  805.0  814.1  827.6  820.2
Genwry,  F.R.  Petail  1,435.0  1,444.1  1,457.6  1,450.2
Ul  Retail  1,745.0  1,444.1  1,457.6  1,450.2
Fr  Petall  1,788.0  1,444.1  1,457.#.  1,450.2
Italy  Retail  2,186.0  1,444.1  1,457.6  1,450.2
Spatn  Portigal  Retall  1,623.0  1,444.1  1,457.6  1,450.2
Other  Bt  Retail  1,.56.0  :,444.1  1,457.6  1,450.2
4  latin  hm!rica  RS  232.0  241.1  254.6  247.2
Jumica  & lind  l.ls.  Rli  553.0  241.1  254.6  247.2
(&zleupe  6  Rertinique  RE  533.0  241.1  254.6  247.2
Cmroon  & C8te  d'lvoire  RB  298.0  241.1  254.6  247.2  1
olla  FtB  291.0  241.1  254.6  247.2
CG sry  & Madeira  RB  496.  241.1  254.6  247.2  w
UtFer  ACPFtI  303.0  241.1  254.6  247.2  1
lqmte  (tUIU  tosn)
tranc  445.2  479.4  159.0  478.1  152.5  478.8  156.1
tai  359.4  390.3  112.8  389.0  107.6  389.8  110.4
Italy  362.8  485.9  314.8  483.7  308.3  484.9  311.9
Spain  & PIrtugal  426.6  473.6  80.5  470.1  74.2  472.0  77.6
-rTiny,  F.K.  668.7  667.0  -6.1  664.5  -15.0  665.9  -10.I
Utler  3X  270.6  278.6  31.8  277.7  28.1  278.2  30.1
Rest  of  lbrld  5,015.9  4,959.0  -45.6  4,875.3  -111.6  4,921.2  -75.5
Einqrts  (-UII  tons)
(tkidela"  6  &brtinque  296.7  134.2  -62.9  141.7  -61.0  217.2  -73.4
JIaacan  & Wiedward Us.  224.7  98.(  -50.3  103.4  -49.0  162.6  -59.2
Cmeroon  & 43te  d'lvolre  133.1  I07.7  6.8  113.7  -5.4  121.8  -6.5
S&aLia  64.0  53.0  -2.9  56.0  -2.2  59.2  -2.7
Canary & fMdelra  440.5  214.2  -83.4  226.1  -eo.5  330.0  -95.9
Other  MP  56.0  44.6  -3.1  47.1  -2.5  50.8  -3.0
Reht  of  WIrld  6,334.2  7,082.3  61.3  6,950.4  149.9  6,749.3  99.5
(koernt  Reme:
France  -12.1  -12.1  -12.1
Lt  -25.4  -25.4  -25.4
Italy  -236.1  -236.1  -236.1
Other  EC  -33.4  -33.4  -33.4
Total  Welfare  192.0  186.4  152.2
ot.tl(uh:  FIN dent.ns  price  elasticity  of smiply for  favwrwa  exp)rters.
F211 devites  iorkce elasticity  of  6upply  f.,r  r4  st  co  tic  world.Table  7:  lvi.ty  Itrcent  Tariff  nn El: Rea  lWorts  from tbilar  Area
Baseline  MF+NI  Welfare  OwC e  tJ?  I  Welfare  Cha,e  l=0.5  Welfare  awRe
E1UW3  (tndllton  USS)  El  (t  million  US$)  Eit(Ol  (mill1on  165)
Prices  (US$/Ton):
1i  RE  393.0  397.2  403.3  400.3
US Retail  805.0  8)9.2  815.3  812.3
Germmy, F.R.  Retail  1.435.0  1.564.9  1.572.2  1,568.6
UK Fetail  1,745.0  1,564.9  1,572.2  1,568.6
F'ramce Retail  1,788.0  1,564.9  1,572.2  1,568.6
Italy  Retail  2,186.0  1,564.9  1,572.2  1,568.6
Spain  & Fbrttgal  Retail  1,623.0  1,564.9  1,572.2  1,568.6
tither  FE Retail  1,560.0  1,564.9  1,572.2  1,568.6
Latin  Aerica  1UB  232.0  236.2  242.3  239.3
Jarnca  d Wintmard Us.  FOB  553.0  361.9  369.2  365.6
tkaleloupe  & Martiniqtae  Ru  533.0  3bl.9  369.2  365.6
(.inrum  & (.te  d'lvoire  HRI  298.0  361.9  369.2  365.6
imalia  UHA  291.0  361.9  369.2  365.6
Cuary  & K-ode1ra PUB  496.0  361.9  369.2  365.6
ltut  R-lId  303.0  361.9  369.2  365.6
mqrort!s t  A) Tcnis)
Erance  445.2  467.4  101.8  466.7  98.4  467.1  1(11.1
UK  359.4  378.0  66.4  377.2  63.7  377.6  65.0
Italy  362.8  465.9  257.4  464.7  254.0  465.3  255.6
Spaln & PortigaI  426.6  441.9  25.2  440.0  22.0  440.9  23.6
Cernany, F.R.  668.7  644.5  -85.3  643.1  -90.0  643.8  -87.7
(ther  FC  270.6  270.3  -1.3  269.8  -3.3  270.0  -2.3
Rest of  Werld  5,015.9  4,989.6  -21.1  4,951.7  -51.3  4,970.4  -36.5
Lxpurts  ((W  Toxs)
(tAdeloupe  & Martiniqim  296.7  201.4  -42.6  205.5  -41.1  250.1  -45.8
Jamaica 6 W1inward lis.  224.7  147.0  -35.5  150.0  -34.4  186.6  -38.5
Clowroon 6 (te  d'lvoire  133.1  161.6  9.4  164.9  10.6  148.2  9.5
Scnalla  64.0  79.6  5.1  81.2  5.7  72.2  5.1
Canary 6 Plidra  441\.5  121.4  -51.1  327.9  -48.7  382.6  -53.7
4Itler  ACP  56.0  6h.9  3.6  68.2  4.1  61.8  3.7
Rest  of  IMrld  6,334.2  6,679.6  27.4  6,615.5  66.7  6,533.6  47.0
t&menuw,it  Rlevdam:
Pr  -lr  1.0  0.1  -3.5
I)K  -4.8  -5.3  -9.1
Italy  -187.6  -187.5  -186.5
titlar  F1  0.6  0.9  0.7
.pain  6 PortztaI  15.1  14.2  7.4
-rmasiry,  F.PR.  81.0  81.6  81.3
Total  Welfare  164.8  160.3  135.5
tI*tatfiXl:  FlN dtwnites  price  elasticity  of  suply  for  favored  eoqxrters.
fisH  deuites  price  elasticity  of  supply  for  rest  of  the world.Table  8:  wenty  Hercat  Tariff  on All  E  Bws  Iqxrts
Baseline  EFIN-  Welfare  hiWe  EFII  kelfare  OrWe  EFI-0.5  Welfare  Qiange
ERa-3  (adiirm  US$)  ElI  (million  US$)  E1l  (mtiUM  US$)
Prices  (tS$/Ton)
US FR  393.0  4)0.9  412.5  405.0
US Retail  E05.0  812.9  824.5  817.0
Gera.ny,  F.R.  Retail  1,435.0  1,569.3  1,583.2  1,574.3
Et  Retail  1,745.0  1,569.3  1,583.2  1,574.3
FrTce  Retail  1,788.0  1,569.3  1,583.2  1,574.3
Italy  Retail  2,186.0  1,569.3  1,583.2  1,574.3
Spain  & Portugal  Petail  1,623.0  ,569.3  1,583.2  1,574.3
Other  EC Retall  1,560.0  1,569.3  1,457.6  1,450.2
Latin  AeL icF  OB  232.0  239.9  251.5  244.0
Jamica  & Wirdward  Us.  FOB  553.0  239.9  251.5  244.0
zaeloupe  & Martinique  FO  533.0  239.9  251.5  244.0
Caeroon  & (Ete  d lvoire  FtB  298.0  239.9  251.5  244.0
Soai  FRO  291.0  239.9  251.5  244.0
Canary & Madeira  MOB  496.0  239.9  251.5  244.0
Other  ACP FM  303.0  239.9  251.5  244.0
Inmprts  (ODD tons)
France  445.2  467.0  99.8  465.6  93.3  466.5  97.4
Ut  359.4  377.5  64.7  376.1  59.5  377.0  62.9  un
Italy  362.8  465.2  255.3  462.8  248.9  464.3  253.0  1
Spain  & Portugal  426.6  440.7  23.3  437.1  17.2  439.4  21.1
Getnmiy,  F.R.  668.7  643.7  -88.1  641.1  -97.0  642.7  -91.3
Other  EC  270.6  270.0  -2.5  269.0  -6.3  269.6  -3.9
Rest  of  World  5,015.9  4,966.6  -39.5  4,894.4  -96.6  4,940.8  -60.0
ExpDrts  ('CO  tons)
Qmdeloupe  & Mabrtinique  296.7  133.5  -63.1  140.0  -61.5  216.3  -74.1
Jamdcan  & Windward Us.  224.7  97.5  -50.4  102.2  -49.3  161.9  -59.7
Caeroon  & 05te  dclvoire  133.1  107.2  -7.0  112.3  -5.7  121.1  -6.9
Somalia  64.0  52.8  -3.0  55.3  -2.4  58.8  -2.9
Canary  & Madeira  440.5  213.1  -83.7  223.4  -81.2  328.6  -96.9
Other  K:P  56.0  44.3  -3.2  46.5  -2.6  50.6  -3.1
Rest  of  WIrld  6,334.2  6,982.2  52.7  6,866.4  128.7  6,663.1  78.3
Gaverrmnt  RePnue:
Frmnce  46.9  47.8  47.2
Ut  22.3  23.0  22.5
Italy  -177.3  -176.5  -177.0
Other  SC  0.8  1.3  0.9
Spain  & Portugal  55.7  56.2  55.9
Gormm3ry,  F.R.  81.3  82.5  81.8
Total  Welfare  185.0  179.2  145.2
Notation:  EFN  derotes  price  elasticity  of  supply  for  favored  exporters.
1W denotes  price  elasticity  of  supply  for  rest  of  the  world.9:  of  n  E
Basellm  EFNI  Welfare Che  EFN-1  Welfare Coe
EROW3  (adn1i0  tS$)  E-1i  (lldl  'o  US$)
Prie  (WISTan):
llS FR  393.0  394.8  397.6
tE  Retail  805.0  806.8  89.6
Geriwy,  F.R  Petail  1,435.0  1,541.3  1,542.9
tK  Retail  1,745.0  1,541.3  1,542.9
France Petail  1,788.0  1,541.3  1,542.9
Italy  Retail  2,186.0  1,541.3  1,542.9
Spain &  Porta1l  retail  1,623.0  1,541.3  1,542.9
Otter  EC  Retail  1,560.0  1,541.3  1,542.9
tatin  Amrica  FM5  232.0  233.8  236.6
Jamica  & Wirdwd  UIs. FOB  553.0  553.0  553.0
QelqO  e  & MRertirdque  FM  533.0  533.0  533.0
Cmrm  &  0ste  d'Ivoire  FMi  298.0  298.0  298.0
lia  RFB  291.0  291.0  291.0
Caary  & Mbaeira  FM  496.0  496.0  496.0
Otb1r ACP  FOB  303.0  303.0  303.0
Tariff  (S)  20  16.7  16.4
hqports ('O00 Tom):
Frae  445.2  469.8  112.9  469.6  112.1
UK  359.4  380.4  75.3  380.2  74.7
Italy  362.8  469.8  268.4  469.5  267.6
Spadn  & Portugal  426.6  448.1  35.7  447.6  35.0
Germany,  F.R.  668.7  6489  -70.0  648.6  -71.7
other  EC  2/0.6  271.9  5.1  271.8  4.6
Rest of Wbrld  5,015.9  5,006.9  -6.8  4,987,3  -23.0
Ewrts  (C0OM  Taom):
Oaalelte  &  6lrtmdiniAe  296.7  296.7  0  296.7  0
cm  6  tae  d'wloire  133.1  133.1  0  133.1  0
Jis  a A Windwrd Us.  224.7  224.7  0  224.7  0
SaMlia  64.0  64.0  0  64.0  0
Camny & 1aeira  440.5  440.5  0  440.5  0
Otter  ACP  56.0  56.0  0  56.0  0
Rest  of World  6,334.2  6,478.7  11.3  6,459.6  29.4
Coarao  P  :  _se
Fran  -12.1  -12.1
UK  -25.4  -25.4
Italy  -236.1  -236.1
OtherE  -33.4  -33.4
Spain  & POrttigl  0  0
Gery,  P.R.  0  0
Total  Welfare  122.7  122.4
Nttatia:  EFN  detes  price  elastirity  of  zpply for  favored eqxprters.
ERlW  derstes  price  elasticity  of sipply  for  rest  of  the wrld.- 27 -
The efficiency  of a deficiency  payments scheme,  financed by tariffs,
as  a  mechanism  for  ensuring a  continuation of  aid  to traditional banana
suppliers, while more efficient than current policies, is still costly.  It
costs the EC an estimated $1.27 to transfer  each dollar received by favored
exporters and  costs non-favored exporters $0.24.  Non-European industrial
importing countries still profit to the tune of an estimated $0.18 for each
dollar transferred, while it costs the world economy an estimated $0.34.  A
deficiency payment scheme financed from general tax revenue may prove to be
slightly more efficient if the tax revenue could be raised for a cost less
than $0.27 for each dollar raised.  The costs and benefits to other parties
would be unaltered.
Direct Payments
Direct payments made in place of deficiency payments would be more
efficient instruments for delivering aid.  Aid provided by raising producer
prices --  such as deficiency payments --  encourages production in favored
exporters.  This in turn lowers the world price and imposes costs on dollar
area  exporters  while  conferring  benefits  to  non-European  industrial
importers.  If the revenue  raised  by the self-financing  tariff  on EC consumers
was made as direct payments to favored  exporters,  rather than to producers  of
bananas in  these countries,  distortions  to trade  and the costs  associated  with
them would be considerably  reduced  (see  Table 10).  Costs per dollar  of aid to
non-favored exporters  could be reduced  to an estimated  $0.025,  and the profit
to  industrial importers would  decline to an estimated $0.02 --  i.e., the
welfare effects would be almost similar to those achieved under free trade.
Residual costs to non-favored  exporters and the world economy remain, due to
the lower EC import  demand caused  by the  tariff.Table  10:  Effects  of  Self-Finmciig  Tariff  a-  EC  Bananma  Im>rts  - Direct  Aid Payent
Baaeli  i  EF'Nl  Welfare  Change  EFN-1  We1fare Change
0Bl-3  (mUllcl  US$)  E(Rl  (cidltcon US$)
Prices  (S$I/Ton)
uS  sN  393.0  401.1  413.3
US  Retail  8e5.0  813.1  825.3
Getrmny, F.L  Petall  1,435.0  1,545.0  1,551.8
tI  Retail  1,745.0  1,545.0  1,551.8
France Retail  1,788.0  1,545.0  1,551.8
Italy  Retail  2,186.0  1,545.0  1,551.8
Spain & Porttval  Retail  1,623.0  1,545.0  1,551.8
Othlr  EC  Retail  1,560.0  1,545.0  1,551.8
lAtin Aeria  FOB  232.0  240.1  252.3
JAmjara  & Wih.erd  Us.  FKB  553.0  240.1  252.3
uadelIWpe  & Martnique  FOB  533.0  240.1  252.3
Ccnre  &  (Bte d'Ivrire  FOB  298.0  240.1  252.3
Soclia  FOB  291.0  240.1  252.3
Crwary  &  Madeira  FOE  496.0  240.1  252.3
i  Other AP  FO  303.0  240.1  252.3
Tariff  (Z)  20  10.1  15.0
lx,rts  ( 000 tauS)
France  445.2  469.4  111.1  468.7  107.9  1
Ut  359.4  380.0  74.0  379.3  71.4  s.
Italy  362.8  469.2  266.7  468.1  263.5  OD
Spain & Pbrttgal  426.6  447.1  34.1  445.3  31.0  1
Germany,  F.R.  668.7  648.2  -72.4  646.9  -76.8
Other EC  270.6  271.6  4.1  271.2  2.2
Rest of World  5,015.9  4,965.1  -40.7  4,889.7  -100.4
Ezport  ('000  tcvs)
Qaeloupe  &  6  tnique  296.7  133.7  -63.0  140.4  -61.4
Crmon  &  G;te d'lvorie  133.1  107.3  -7.0  112.7  -5.6
Janica  & Winr.zd  Uls.  224.7  97.6  -50.4  102.5  -49.2
scu.wIa  64.0  52.8  -3.0  55.5  -2.3
Carnay  6 ?Idelra  440.5  213.3  -83.6  224.0  -'81.0
Other KP  56.0  44.4  -3.2  46.6  -2.6
Direct  Ald Payunt  273.3  259.0
Rest of World  6,334.2  7,001.7  54.3  6,887.4  133.9
GoveMnat  leve,:
Frarme  -12.1  -12.1
Ut  -25.4  -25.4
Italy  -236.1  -236.1
OthetrE  -33.4  -33,4
Spain & Pbrtugal  0  0
uereny,  F.R.  0  0
Total Welfare  187.3  182.7
tbtation:  EFN  dewtes  price  elasticity  of  smpPly  for  favored exporters.
EWW  deaoes  price  elasticity  of supply for  rest  of the world.- 29 -
Direct  aid  payments  would  confer  other  advantages.  The  self-
financing taritL would fall from an estimated 16.7% to 16.1% because of the
higher world  price, and efficiency losses arising from over-production of
bananas in traditional  supplying  countries  would be eliminated.  If the
revenue raised  by  the  16.1% tariff were directly transferred, traditional
suppliers would  not  incur costs in producing bananas over and  above  the
optimal free trade levels  --  banana  production in these countries  would fall
by around 46.6%, the same as in the free trade case.  The resources saved
could be use'  in other enterprises and would confer additional benefits on
these  countries  compared  to  what  they  would  receive  under  deficiency
payments.  Based on estimates from the model, the resources saved would be
worth around $64m  annually.  That is, compared to the current  policies,  which
provide  an  estimated  welfare  benefit  of  $209m  to  traditional supplying
countries, direct-aid payments  would confer a benefit of around $273m (i.e.,
$64m more) while at the same time the welfare of the EC could be increased  by
around $110m.  Overall, the cost to the world economy of transferring each
dollar of aid would be around $0.02  only.  It is  unlikely  that raising the  aid
payment through  general taxation  measures  or even through specific  sales taxes
would be more efficient than through the 16.1% tariff.  Ballard, Shaven and
Whalley (1985), for instance, estimate that the cost to the US economy of
raising an extra dollar of general tax revenue in 1973  was in the range $0.17
to $0.56,  and using sales taxes  alone,  it cost $0.03 for  every dollar raised.
Long-term, direct payments are likely to confer other benefits on
favored exporters.  Direct aid payments could be efficiently targeted.  They
could be used to modernize the banana industries  of such countries  --  to make
them  more competitive  --  or be used to help diversify their  economies.  Under
current arrangements,  through  deficiency  payments,  aid tends to lock resources
into inefficient,  high-cost  sectors.- 30 -
5. Conclusion
The banana  policies  of the  EC member states  are inconsistent  with the
idea of  a  single European market to be  established in  1992.  Currently,
favored exporters receive a  subsidy equivalent (or a type of aid) from the
various  import arrangements operated by  the EC member  states.  A  single
European market will lead to the elimination  of those differences in import
arrangements.  The results  of the  model simulations  shown  above indicate  that
banana exports from favored exporters will decline by about one-half under
free trade.  Their exports will decline by 28% even under  the protection  of a
20% tariff on imports from dollar areas.  This is mainly due to competition
from the low-cost  exports from  Central  and South  America.
In view of the importance  of banana  exports to the favored  supplying
countries  and  given  their  traditional relationships with  the  EC,  it  is
possible that the Community will design common measures to ensure them some
form of preferred  market access.  However, the wiser strategy in the long run
for these countries might be to seek direct aid payments from the EC.  Such
aid could be specifically  targetted  to improve  the long-run  efficiency  of the
banana industries  or to diversify  their  economies.
Direct aid payments provide many other advantages over alternative
instruments  which deliver  aid through  raising  producer  prices.
Under  current  arrangements,  gross  inefficiencies  exist  in
transferring each dollar of aid to favored exporters.  Such inefficiencies
could be largely  eliminated  through  the  use of direct aid payments  and a self-
financing tariff.  Such a policy  would create only minimal distortions in the
pattern of  consumption, production and trade.  The elimination of current
inefficiencies  would place the EC in a position  to pro-ide  a higher level of
aid to traditional  suppliers  at lower  total  cost.- 31  -
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